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ABSTRACT
Looking at most African countries, one realises that the social imaginaries which 
make us who we are, continue to be an issue in every society. It is even more 
rampant when we think of the role religion plays in determining who we are, what we 
believe and how we should act and react. This article seeks to look at the nature of 
religion and how religion over the years played a significant role in African identity. 
This article proposes that African identity has been endangered by religion; that 
there is a need to rethink our conceptualisation of religion and to move away from 
the understanding of religion as the basis of identity. This is because our shared 
lives should and must be the basis of identity. In other words, imported religions 
have their own origin and this origin cannot be disassociated from the belief inherent 
in the religions. There is a need to free the mind of its conditionings that give priority 
to religion and may therefore serve to exclude other sources of identity derived from 
collective histories and collective experiences. The illusion which religion plunges 
us into is often the reason for the problems of identity which most African societies 
struggle with today. An awareness of this illusion and a new understanding of identity 
as derived from a shared African experience, will go a long way in resolving the 
problem of identity in Africa.
Keywords: Identity; Matrix; awareness; African; devalue; religion.
INTRODUCTION
Sometimes, when musing about life from the viewpoint of religion, one could wish 
to have been God – contemplating about how to have made things better. One of the 
many good things that come to mind, is to have made people appreciate each other 
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and learn to see their similarities more than their socially constructed differences, 
especially those of religious affiliations, cultural or ethnic identities. Given our 
experience of violence, none of us would mind a deterministic configuration of 
humanity that is at unity with itself; at least peace would be assured. When you look 
at an individual, you are looking at someone who carries within him/herself a set of 
different signals of identity. When, for example, someone who knows West Africa 
asks me, “What is your name?” and I say, “I am John Sodiq Sanni”, a quizzical look 
appears on the face of my questioner. Those who are brave enough go on to ask, 
“What sort of combination is that, and where are you from?” I am sure you will also 
be puzzled and you cannot wait to reach the part where I answer this question − that 
is if I respond to it at all. The tangle of names signifies the diverse origin of my 
parents. My father was a Muslim and my mother a Christian.
Nonetheless, the crux of the issue is not only about names and how names 
point to a particular culture, but also how identities in the cultural hermeneutical 
underpinnings of names have been displaced by religious identities. African 
identity has become not so much about ethnic background but also about religious 
viewpoints; and I believe people in Africa may give the latter more significance than 
the former. The problem is that recent events in several African states have given a 
greater urgency to the place of religion in determining identity. Circumstances have 
valorised religious affiliations so that we think of a person in terms of religion and, 
as a result, that person thinks of him/herself in terms of religion. Our subjectivities 
are constructed not by what we think but how society has constructed how we should 
think; religion plays a holistic role in determining a person’s understanding of his/
her origin and purpose. 
Daniel Dennett (2006) rightly observes “that one of the most difficult tasks is 
finding the right questions to ask and the right order to ask them in. You have to 
figure out not only what you don’t know, but what you need to know and don’t need 
to know, and what you need to know in order to figure out what you need to know, 
and so forth” (Dennett 2006: 19). Our apparently unending quest to provide answers 
to the unknown has often been the justification for religion. This is the case because 
of the increase of religious leaders who often claim to have access to some divine 
revelations, purported to be an indisputable answer to the eternal question which 
troubles human beings. 
The aim of this article is to differentiate between “identity as origin” and 
“identity as religion” and to prioritise the wider commonality that is inherent in 
identity as origin. I will also consider the need to free the mind of its conditioning 
that gives priority to religion and may therefore serve to exclude other sources of 
identity derived from collective histories and collective experiences. This implies that 
religion is not a collective experience as it is sometimes claimed to be. A prejudiced 
humanist may accuse religion of directing our attention to a transcendental teleology 
and in the process distracting us from our contingent reality. If one is to argue that the 
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nature of reality is similar to that of identity, religion erodes identity. It is, however, 
impossible to theorise contemporary Africa and ignore the presence and influence of 
imported religions. By imported religion, I mean religions which are not uniquely 
African. Put differently, imported religions are those that infiltrated African societies 
through their interactions with other continents. Africa is multicultural and many 
of the sites of that multiculturalism have been constructed by both imported and 
indigenous religions. 
A theoretical approach as to how we can resist imported religions’1 
oversimplification of African identity is provided by revisiting Charles Taylor’s 
notion of “multiculturalism and the politics of recognition”. I will argue that there is a 
need to rethink the significance of religious diversity and an ontology that recognises 
the Other as part of Oneself. This very deep African notion which one finds in the 
Ubuntu2 concept is explicit in Taylor’s idea of recognition. This informs my use of 
Taylor’s postulations in this article. For Taylor, the politics of recognition proceeds 
from the proposition of an ontological ethical notion of the Other as a relational 
identity. I shall first offer definitions of important concepts.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Beginning with religion, amidst the different definitions, this paper appropriates the 
definition proposed by Monica Toft’s account that talks about “belief in supernatural 
being or beings”; belief in a transcendent reality; distinction between the sacred and 
the profane; and a code of conduct for a temporal community that shares a world 
view (see Toft 2011: 115). Toft’s definition of religion has a holistic dimension to 
it which is similar to the understanding of African traditional religion (ATR). The 
understanding of ATR here is ‘…the indigenous religious beliefs and practices of 
the Africans’ (Awolalu 1976: 1). Religion becomes the convergence point for other 
multiple perspectives which all seem to proceed from religion or seem to have their 
basis in religion. Olusegun Oladipo (1998), makes the convergence more explicit 
when he argues that religion is not only belief in a metaphysical being, but also a 
disposition towards that which one believes in. 
Does religion also encompass identity or does it create identity? If one considers 
the fact that self-identity is largely based on community or a belonging, this identity 
cannot be isolated or entirely separated from this belonging. If this is the case, it 
will be plausible to argue that religion is identity, as it gives an individual a sense of 
belonging. It is, however, not as straightforward at it appears. A definition of identity 
1 The phrase ‘imported religion’ is used to designate religions which came with colonialism and the 
Arabian trade. In order to avoid overgeneralisation, I refer to Christianity and Islam.
2 The Ubuntu concept is largely based on the idea that the one only exists because of the existence 
of Others. To ignore the existence of other people is to automatically deny one’s existence (see 
Ramose 1998).
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might help unpack the puzzle that is implicit in the understanding of religion and its 
relation to identity. Identity, as presented by scholars like Taylor, is two dimensional: 
collective and personal. 
Personal identity may be defined as the capability of conscious subjects to remain identical 
with themselves, despite changes that affect the structure of their personality. It is the unity 
and continuity of self-consciousness. Persons as conscious subjects are repeatedly faced with 
situations that challenge the existing structure of their consciousness – in other words, which 
contradict the way they feel, the way they think, the way they act. They can meet those 
situations and cope with the experience they involve only by reconstructing their personality 
or acquiring a new self, as we say. (Taylor 1994: 134 -135)
The collective dimension plays a significant role in enacting and authenticating the 
personal identity. It is important to also add that the response to the question of 
identity is also determined by context. Thus it has a local and international dimension 
which influences response. This will be further explored during the course of this 
paper. “Personal identity, as also collective identity, is a normative concept, not just 
descriptive. It is not used merely to describe a state of affairs, but to express an ideal 
to be striven for, a value to be embodied. For that reason, we can speak of a ‘loss of 
identity’, an ‘identity crisis’, of [sic] a ‘weak identity’ and so on” (Davis 1994: 135). 
African understanding of identity leaves very little room for personal autonomy, as 
one is only a person in so far as the person follows the moral dictates of the society 
(Okolo 1998: 213). In other words, an individual is only said to find himself within a 
society. In isolation, he is said not to exist. As opposed to an individual essence, there 
is an emphasis on collective significance in the African comprehension of identity.
IS IDENTITY RELIGIOUS?
At the beginning of this article, I asked how religion shapes or impacts our identity, 
especially in an African context where identity and religion are often implicated in 
one another. What does one make of religion in relation to identity? Is it possible to 
delineate cultural identity without explicit reference to religion? These questions, 
among many others, show the complex nature of religion as identity and culture as 
identity in relation to a person. These questions connect culture and identity because 
it is only from cultural relations that identity is realised.
As much as it can be argued that culture and religion can be separated − a 
point which will be argued as this article unfolds − it is important to note that most 
African “creation narratives” always have a religios dimension to them, which is 
intrinsically connected to cultural habits and actions. African traditional cultures 
often trace their origin to some religious narratives of some sort. A case in point is 
that of the Yoruba people in Nigeria who refer to Olodumare as the creator of all, 
and they allude to other demigods who mediate between Olodumare and human 
beings (Oladipo 1998: 204). Similar narratives span through other African cultures. 
75
Sanni Religion: A New Struggle for African Identity
Does this justify the religious interpretation of cultures or the “religionising” of 
identity? Perhaps not! The opening remark of John Mbiti’s African religions and 
philosophy – “The African is notoriously religious” (Mbiti 1969: 1) sheds light on 
the understanding of the religious nature of most African cultures. If most cultures 
are religious, why should Africans be notoriously religious? Oladipo (1998) attempts 
a response to this question when he argues that as opposed to an understanding 
of religion from the viewpoint of religious experiences, religion in an African is 
interpreted from an attitudinal point of view (Oladipo 1998: 201-202). This position 
is different for an understanding of religion as mere experience, in that there is also a 
dimension which calls for a physical religious disposition, which Oladipo refers to as 
“religious attitude”. He defines religious attitude as “a response to that ‘thing’ which 
is considered to be the ultimate reality and which, for that reason, is indestructible” 
(Oladipo 1998: 203). Religion as attitude implies that it permeates all facets of life. 
A good example is the demigod of farmers, Òrisà Oko, who is implored for a good 
harvest (Oladipo 1998: 206) and Sango, the demigod of thunder who is often called 
upon for retribution purposes. In most cases these beckonings on demigods are done 
through rituals.
In these rituals, religion is not conflated with culture as the source of identity, 
but is rather a dimension of it. If the rudimentary definition of culture as a total way 
of life is adopted, religion is not a total way of life of any given culture. It is only 
a facet of a larger world view. This does not rule out the fact that: “As a complex 
of symbols and as a cultural institution, religion claims in some form to provide 
answers to questions of ultimate meaning, questions about the nature and destiny of 
human beings. And religion, unlike comprehensive ideologies…seeks its answers in 
a transcendental realm, in an appeal to some supernatural power” (Davis 1994: 22). 
Religion only provides transcendental explanations to reality and this only serves to 
placate people in their desire for explanations. Even if religion can be said to play a 
significant role, it does not necessarily justify the claim that it is dominant, since it 
can be distinguished from other facets of life which have nothing to do with religion.
The question of differentiating religion from culture is not as easy as it seems. 
The question of what category religion belongs to cannot be left unaddressed. 
Before attempting this issue, I will nuance my understanding of African traditional 
religion. When I refer to African traditional religion in relation to culture, I mean that 
religion and culture have different modes of expression in the society. In Africa’s 
diversity, there is a commonality which is connected to African experience and an 
appeal to a transcendental reality often referred to as God. Religion has a category 
of its own, which justifies my initial claim that religion is only a facet of culture. 
In fact, religious practices show that it is a plea to God to intervene in realities 
which cannot be “understood” by human beings. This is noticeable in the rituals and 
prayers that are carried out when people lose their beloved ones through death. Even 
if one is to argue that religion is to seek divine intervention which we do understand: 
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joblessness or sickness, there is still a dilemma regarding the interpretation on how 
divine interventions are to be understood. At this point, I would like to draw from 
the movie, Matrix, to buttress the point I have been making. The aim is to juxtapose 
and then elaborate the difference between religion and culture. The intended motive 
remains the same: culture, as experience, is much more than religion.
RELIGIOUS MATRIX
The word Matrix derives from the movie of the same name, which astounds in action 
and makes astonishing use of special graphical effects. Since the first Matrix was first 
screened, philosophers over the years have acknowledged that the movie has some 
philosophical implications which point to modern and contemporary intellectual 
systems. Hubert Dreyfus and Stephen Dreyfus argue:
What the phenomenologist can and should claim is that, in a Matrix world where bodies are 
in vats, the people whose brains are getting virtual reality inputs correlated with their action 
outputs, are nonetheless directly coping with perceived reality, and that that reality isn’t 
experienced as inner. Even in the Matrix world, people directly relate to perceived chairs by 
sitting on them. Thus coping, even in the Matrix, is more direct than conceived of by any of 
the inner/outer views of the mind’s relation to the external world that have been held from 
Descartes to Husserl. (Dreyfus and Dreyfus n.d.: 3)
The implication of Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s argument to religion, which the movie 
Matrix and the sequel construe, is that it has had a numbing effect on humanities’ 
conceptualisation of what constitutes reality. This point will be addressed as this 
paper proceeds. The movie shows that “the people who live in the Matrix have no 
other source of experience than what happens in the Matrix” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
n.d.: 3).
Dreyfus and Dreyfus go on to argue that: ‘To understand what is wrong with 
living in the Matrix world we have to understand the source of the power of the 
Matrix illusion. Part of the power comes from the way the inputs and outputs from 
the computer are plugged directly in the brain’s sensory motor-system. When we 
experience ourselves as acting in a certain way, say walking inside a house, the 
computer gives us the correlated experiences of seeing the interior’ (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus n.d.: 5). What this indicates is that even within the illusory world there is 
a sense in which, more than just a cognitive action, there is need for a pragmatic 
awareness of the Matrix; thus necessitating a correlation between the cognitive and 
the pragmatic within the Matrix. It is important at this point to reintroduce the idea 
of the soul which I hinted at in the paragraph above. 
The religious Matrix can be likened to an ‘idea’ which people willingly or 
sometimes forcefully allow themselves to be connected to or enchanted by; an idea 
that presents an ethereal horizon as if it is reality which contains an ideal state of 
being. The acceptance of these ideal states of being often results in the creation of 
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ideologies to further legitimise this ideal state. This is why “Religion sets criteria for 
judging what human beings imagine or make is good and worthwhile. It questions 
whether we are right to regard as valueless everything we have not made ourselves” 
(Davis 1994: 22). Over the years Boko Haram3 has been reported to carry out the 
bombing of schools, churches and mosques; the abducting of school girls in northern 
Nigeria; killings in Cameroon and Chad; and bomb blasts in Nairobi (Chothia 2015). 
Elsewhere on the continent a Sudanese woman was condemned to death by hanging 
for apostasy in marrying a Christian. 
What one realises with religions today is that there is an obsession with the 
ethereal; a reality that justifies the Christian hymn (“This world is not my own”) 
and the Islamic quest to make the world “the abode of Allah – dar Islam”. A unique 
difference is, however, identified in the African traditional religion as there is great 
emphasis on the realities of the culture and this has often been the contextualised 
Matrix for relating with God. In most African cultures, especially in West Africa, when 
there is doubt about the credibility of a diviner, more credible diviners are sourced 
from neighbouring villages. This is not to defend African traditional religious forms 
of ritual killing(s). Perhaps instances like these are questionable and also require that 
Africans adopt fully the phenomenological understanding of religious beliefs.
With the advent of imported religions, I argue that Africans have not been 
able to live their identities and theorise themselves in a world where Africa’s own 
contributions to cultural and social organisation have been denigrated or even 
ignored. The African traditional religions have been frequently devalued and only 
the authority of imported religions is seen to have significance. One of the questions 
this might provoke is, is religion a new form of Western colonialism? We must also 
wonder if religion is the suppression of an identity and the imposition of an ideology. 
It is no exaggeration that African traditional religions have been seen as culturally 
irrelevant by some if not most Africans, and imported religions are now so embedded 
in the psychology of Africans that most Africans have been lulled into acceptance 
thereof. “The human capacity to wonder – a capacity that is universal – may give rise 
to two different attitudes: one of superstitious leading to beliefs and presuppositions 
that can hardly be rationally and scientifically grounded; the other is rational leading 
to beliefs and explanations that can be grounded in reason” (Gyekye 2004: 29). 
Gyekye's (2004) use of the words ‘superstitious’, ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ is a 
clear sign that he has bought into rhetoric and labels of imported Western religions. 
African traditional cultures have wondered and, arguably, the outcomes may not fall 
under the category of that which is ‘rational and scientific’, but it is not far removed 
from the experience of the people. African traditional cultures have survived many 
3 Boko Haram is a pseudo name for a movement called, Jama’atul Ahlus Sunna Lid Da’awatis 
Jihad. The Boko Haram sect is Islamic and said to have links with Al Qaeda. The term Boko 
Haram has to do with their ideological framework rather than their identity. 
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centuries because the outcomes of their wonder have not been detrimental to their 
existence.
Different from Gyekye’s (2004) assertion, Davis (1994) argues that “Traditional 
religious people have a conventional identity. Their religious identity is tied to the 
fixed contents of a tradition, to its institutions and practices…Any substantial change 
in the normative content and rules of the tradition is experienced as a loss of identity 
and, consequently, is fiercely resisted” (Davis 1994: 141). Davis goes on to say that 
“History shows that such a conventional religious identity may flourish in a naïve 
fashion while simply ignoring the existence of other traditions and thus evading the 
reflection which a taking cognizance of their existence would provoke” (Davis 1994: 
141). Davis’s arguments are true, but some flaws can be spotted. Davis is right in 
positing that African traditional religious disposition is conventional because these 
traditions are considered to be sacred. However, as I argued in the early part of this 
article, African traditional culture is never reluctant in seeking solutions to problems 
by imploring or appropriating norms which are not unique to its customs. Imported 
religions have a tendency to suspend the experiential dimension of individuals; and 
it is a reality which needs to be subdued in order to be in touch with the actions in 
realities of the world, which provokes certain reactions.
Colonialism has had a role in effecting this reality in the imaginary of Africans. 
As Taylor argues: “It is held that since 1492 Europeans have projected an image of 
such people as somehow inferior, ‘uncivilised,’ and through the force of conquest 
have often been able to impose this image on the conquered” (Taylor 1994: 26). 
Everything that came with colonialism had the intent of civilising, eradicating the 
inferior image that was perceived in Africa and above all, creating a new culture 
and identity. Kwasi Wiredu’s scenario of a Luo person in a Luo culture, with this 
no narrative or understanding of creation, is a good example to further illustrate this 
point. A Luo person was once asked: “Who made you?” After saying that he does 
not know, the missionary told him that a better response would be provided (Wiredu 
1998: 34). Colonialists’ intention must not be seen in a negative light alone, neither 
must it be analysed with an uncritical lens. Given the happening in some African 
countries, it is important to think of the role imported religions should have in the 
continent.
RELIGIOUS MATRIX AND MULTIPLE MATRIX
Identity has to do with the experience of a certain Matrix. It has to do with a certain 
awareness of one’s “situatedness” as a starting point. This is where important 
questions arise: Who am I? What am I? It is significant to note that religion often 
creates a Matrix which can sometimes promote a new structure within society. This 
is not purely negative, as it can be said to have a unifying nature to it in that it creates 
a new collective purpose. However, there is a sense in which these new religious 
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structures base their authenticity on a transcendental justification, which may not be 
accessible to those who do not adhere to their beliefs. 
Such a structure would include the view of Menachem Begin, who once said: 
“Nobody has the right to tell me whether I can stay in Judea and Samaria, since 
this right is given to me by God and Father of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob” (quoted 
in Davis 1994: 112). Also would be included the self-ascribed nature of Christian 
and Muslim religious monopoly of validity. “The monological ideal seriously 
underestimates the place of the dialogical in human life. It wants to confine it as 
much as possible to the genesis” (Taylor 1994: 33). In most cases, the imported 
religious monologue, hegemony and strive for monopoly make human beings and 
their experiences expendable. Human experiences have not been of great significance 
in Africa’s understanding of their identity, as little or no emphasis has been placed on 
the African experiences. If such experiences have been mentioned at all they have 
been distorted by religious obfuscating rhetoric which draws its authority from the 
supremacy of an imported religion. More and more in Africa one experiences a trans-
border religious relationship. A reality that has made people more interested in what 
is happening among the people whom they share the same religion with, rather than 
those they share the same experience with. African experiences sometimes fall prey 
to the superimposed hegemony of religious world views. What remains glaring is that 
religious [imported religious] experiences do not consider other experiences as that 
which is also part of their experience; the tendency is to control and redefine other 
people’s experiences. This is not to say that religious views cannot be categorised 
under experience. The point I emphasise here is that shared religious world view 
has been prioritised when compared with other experiences. There is something 
fundamental in imported religion which cannot be separated from the cultural matrix 
in their origin and the cultural matrix in which they are received.  This justifies the 
bond often promoted across borders.
As much as cultural Matrix, “what we mean by identity…who we are, where 
we’re coming from” (Taylor 1994: 33) is considered important, it is equally important 
that our striving for multiple matrixes does not obliterate the consciousness of our 
cultural Matrix. As already highlighted, religion cannot be separated from its cultural 
Matrix. As Africans, gullible tendencies must not override our reflective impulse. 
As Armstrong recounts: “In all cultures, human beings have been driven by the 
same imperatives: to be intelligent, responsible, reasonable, loving and, if necessary, 
change. The very nature of humanity, therefore, demands that we transcend ourselves 
and our current perceptions and this principle indicates the presence of what has 
been called the divine in the very nature of serious human inquiry” (Armstrong 
1993: 185).
The attempt to include the human inquiry has often resulted in a major lapse in 
the conception of religion. In fact, it raises a fundamental question as to how “the 
80
Sanni Religion: A New Struggle for African Identity
dignity of the individual as an absolute value be retained without a relation to the 
Absolute?” Davis goes on to “suggest that the individual is of unconditional worth, 
because at the deepest level the personal self is one with Absolute Reality” (Davis 
1994: 151). To claim that the self has an absolute reality can actually plunge us back 
to the reality which further raises the question of the origin of this absolute reality. 
Then we are back to square one!
Amidst the religious differences which can be identified, the point which 
should take precedence in the midst of the diversity is the idea of recognition of the 
difference and the integration of imported religion to the cultural Matrix in which we 
find ourselves. This assertion does not rule out the fact that imported Matrix should 
not give reason to rethink our own Matrix. The point is that it should not make us, 
Africans, oblivious of our Matrix. Most Christians have talked about the whole idea 
of enculturation as a way of being in touch with how different African cultures can 
be incorporated into Christianity and vice versa. However, one realises that this has 
not really been in touch with the experiences of the people and consequently ignores 
the main part of the African identity.
Imported religions from the onset have engaged in a monologue and they have 
insisted on imposing this monologue on Africans, and Africans have unconsciously 
appropriated this monologue and ignored the significant of dialogue with experience. 
Taylor argues that “General recognition was built into the socially derived identity 
by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social categories that everyone took 
for granted. Yet inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn’t enjoy this 
recognition a priori – recognition has to be attained through exchange and the 
attempt to fail” (Taylor 1994: 34-35). This is an assertion which may also imply that 
“religious traditions do not have to be conceived as static and unchanging. Rather, 
they possess a temporality of their own, a rhythm which may be more fundamental 
than the time of the philosophers” (Rosemann 2007: 161). 
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
UNIFYING MATRIX
The onus is ours “The God of Jews, Christians and Muslims is a God who - in some 
sense - speaks. His Word is crucial in all three faiths. The Word of God has shaped the 
history of our culture. We have to decide whether the word ‘God’ has any meaning 
for us today” (Armstrong 1993: 16) as Africans. When we pledge allegiance to a 
particular religion, it is a commitment to a set of norms. It is important to know that: 
… norms are not created out of nothing. They are formed out of the needs, interests and 
wants of actual human beings. The normative thus presupposes and builds upon the factual 
truths about human beings established in the cognitive sphere of culture; but the normative 
should be distinguished from the cognitive. Human beings come together in society, creating 
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norms and embodying them in institutions through a process of social interaction. (Davis 
1994: 27)
This calls for constructive possibilities as a good disposition for understanding the 
multiplicity inherent in experiences. The point here is that the point of departure 
must always be from the experience within which we are situated: ‘…our thinking 
and philosophy…[must be] directed toward the redemption of our society’ (Nkrumah 
1998:81). It is only by thinking within our context that the contents of our reactions 
are positively informed. I guess it is equally important for the outside to pay attention 
to these experiences so as to better engage the experience of mission venues.
It is evident that over the years, religious ideas have been spilling into politics. 
“Religious beliefs are the changing, limited, culturally particular manifestation of 
religious faith. Therefore, in political argument, religious people must be prepared 
to see their religious beliefs challenged. They must refrain from using any weapons 
to advance their beliefs other than the force of better argument” (Davis 1994: 36). 
The question is, who determines the criteria for what a better argument entails? The 
nature of a better argument, I will argue, is one which is not ideological and does not 
claim essentialist and infallible attributes, such that are not disposed to the truths in 
other arguments. The significance we give to each other enables us to live together 
and respect epistemological diversities and experience as the foundation.
However, it is a misconception to let go of their prejudice or allow themselves 
to be subdued by others. Deep-seated political questions cannot be understood, 
unless individuals learn to subdue and transcend their individual inclinations, and 
open up to unlimited reality through engaging in diverse and unlimited responses 
to reality (Davis 1994: 36-37). This reality must not replace African realities, but 
it can challenge Africans in their situatedness. For Taylor (1994), the politics of 
recognition proceeds from the proposition that an ontological ethical notion of the 
Other as a relational identity, must not be ignored. The point here is that ontology, 
understood as the question about the meaning of being, is a reality that is unique 
to every human being. As such, there is a moral obligation, in fact an imperative, 
that individual experiences must be respected. The experiences which constitute the 
otherness of the Other, always inform individual uniqueness.
CONCLUSION
Africans have appropriated the notion that religion is typically essentialist in nature 
and in most cases not subjected to revision (Rosemann 2007: 171). An ideology that 
shows how “…Religion elevates the rhythm of nature to a symbolic level, conferring 
spiritual meaning upon it. This sublimation of natural time enables us to live in 
accordance with natural rhythms of summer and winter, life and death, and so forth, 
while also creating a distance from them – a space in which authentically human 
meaning can arise that transcends merely natural cycles” (Rosemann 2007: 178). 
82
Sanni Religion: A New Struggle for African Identity
The point here is that we have become more in touch with nature (experience) and 
the reason behind our experiences. This can be achieved if we return religion to its 
rightful source, which is experience.
Quoting Rabindranath Tagore’s Man the artist, Martha Nussbaum recounts: “At 
a certain bend in the path of evolution man refused to remain a four-footed creature, 
and the position, which he made his body to assume, carried in it a permanent gesture 
of insubordination” (Nussbaum 2013: 82). The significance of imported religions 
should be to better help us be in touch with our experiences. To walk on four-feet 
when we have to and then not deter us from walking on two feet when we know 
it helps us see what we cannot see when on four feet. And our decisions must be 
influenced by our own experiences as Africans, for it is who we are and where we 
are coming from. A healthy mutual understanding of the contingencies that make us 
who we are, and the contingencies of the Matrix from which we are formed, should 
be given priority in Africa. It is only in understanding the contingency that makes us, 
that we realise that identity is not religion but origin.
As Taylor recounts: “Negate identity by forcing people into a homogeneous 
mould that is untrue to them” (Taylor 1994: 43). Like Neo in the movie Matrix, “We 
are led to expect that, in return for accepting everyday vulnerability and suffering, 
the people liberated by Neo [experience] will be reborn to a new and better life” 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus n.d.: 7). Hence, “What’s ultimately important to us, then, is 
not whether most of our beliefs are true or false, or whether we are brave enough 
to face a risky reality, but whether we are locked into a world of routine, standard 
activities or are free to transform the world and ourselves” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
n.d.: 11) and to focus on our experiences. We have given power to religion. We have 
to reclaim the power we have given to religion and channel it to experience, where 
our identity lies.
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